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SELF-RELIANCE
RANDALL P. BEZANSON*

The enterprise of attributing unifying themes to the work of a Justice of the United States Supreme Court is a dangerous, perhaps even
foolhardy, one. It is even worse to do so on an incomplete, even consciously impressionistic, record. Yet the essay form provides a certain
license for speculation, especially for one whose claims are explicitly
more limited and who makes no pretense of exhaustiveness of research
or conclusiveness of judgment. At least I hope that is so, for my intention is to speculate about a theme that I find in Justice Blackmun's jurisprudence, to do so in the brief medium of the essay, and to largely focus
my inquiry on a highly selected group of cases decided early in his tenure on the Court.
Many of the cases I have selected are from the 1972 Term. As that
is when I clerked for Justice Blackmun, it is when I came to know his
work most intimately. The 1972 Term (like the Terms surrounding it)
was a formative one. For the Court it represented the point of transition
from the Warren Era to the Burger Court: a remarkably interesting and
challenging docket of cases whose issues or claims found their origin in
the prior era,' and others whose resolution would chart new courses for
the future. 2 For Justice Blackmun, too, it was a time of transition, for
having been on the Court since 1971 his own views began to emerge
from the now-larger body of opinions which had flowed from his pen.
A theme that I. find emerging in Justice Blackmun's work during
this formative period is liberty-an idea that is distinguishable from freedom, alone, because it speaks both of freedom and responsibility. It
speaks about the human condition at a more complex level than either
freedom or responsibility .

.

. about what it means to be a whole person

possessed of the capacity for the exercise of conscious free will, a
capacity that is constitutionally incomplete unless accompanied by
assumption of responsibility for its consequences. This kind of liberty
was not, for Justice Blackmun, the outgrowth of a social or political
theory, whether individualism, communitarianism, republicanism, or any
other "ism". It rested instead on a deep and profound insight into what
* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University.
1. Eqg., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973).
2. Eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973).
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it means to be human, to be a "person" capable of bearing the moral,
social, and political responsibilities of freedom in the Constitutional
sense. It viewed freedom as incomplete without responsibility, and
therefore government action lifting responsibility to be as potentially
corrosive of liberty as government action that directly denied freedom.
It viewed the exercise of liberty as a social act, not one done in isolation;
as an act that most often involved the participation and counsel of others
...as well, of course, as consequences for others. But in the end the
exercise of liberty-the choices that must be made-rests only with the
individual, for the individual must bear the consequences of his or her
liberty. The exercise of liberty, in other words, is a self-reliant act.
Both before and after his retirement from the Court Justice
Blackmun's body of judicial work has been regularly described with
such terms as "sympathy," "humanity," "compassion," and "protective of those without power." 3 These terms, I think, are quite accurate;
indeed, I have used them myself. But I have also been of the view that,
standing alone, they are incomplete . . . that they lack connecting fibre
and a clear foundation in constitutional theory. While sympathy is a
commendable frame of mind, it does not alone contain the makings of
constitutional law. Not surprisingly, when applied to Justice Blackmun's
opinions such terms lack explanatory power as well, for they leave too
many unexplained twists and turns in the body of his judicial work.
How, for example, can sympathy or compassion account for, much less
reconcile, Justice Blackmun's general deference to classifications based
on wealth 4 even near-destitution, 5 on the one hand, especially in view of
his active hostility to government refusal to extend health care benefits to
poor women who would choose abortion,6 on the other?
I do not claim to have comprehensive answers to this and similar
questions, but I am of the view that they cannot be fairly judged without
reference to certain basic themes that animate Justice Blackmun's
constitutional philosophy: a recognition of the fundamental and wide3. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Harry Blackmun, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 694 (1994); Diane P.
Wood, Justice Blackmun and Individual Rights, 97 DICK. L. REV. 421 (1993); Note, The Changing
Social Vision ofJustice Blackmun, 96 HAv. L. REV. 717 (1983); Lynn E. Blais, Simple JusticelSimple
Murder: Reflections on Judicial Modesty, Federal Habeas and Justice Blackmun's Capital Punishment
Jurisprudence, 97 DICK. L. REV. 513 (1993); Nina Totenberg, Harry Blackmun: The Conscientious
Conscience, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 745 (1994); Herman Schwartz, Justice Blackmun, 43 AM. U. L. REV.
737 (1994); Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing Compassion into the Province of Judging: Justice Blackmun
and the Outsiders, 97 DICK. L. REV. 527 (1993); Harold H. Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice
Blackmun and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMuNE L. REV. 51 (1985).
4. Eg., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
5. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
6. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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ranging importance of "liberty" in his opinions; and an understanding
of what constitutional liberty means for Justice Blackmun-a meaning
captured, I think, by the term "self-reliance." Self-reliance is, perhaps
not coincidentally, a "Midwestern" trait that resonates well with the
individualism manifested in the Bill of Rights. Self-reliance connotes
liberty and responsibility. Indeed, it implies (at least in the sense I am
using it) that without individual responsibility there is no true liberty, for
liberty is, in a Calvinistic sort of way, earned and paidfor.
Such a view of liberty (or freedom, or equality) necessarily implies
that governmental action that impedes the individual's own freedom to
define his or her values and choices, or that imposes values and choices
on the individual's decisions, should be met with skepticism. 7 On the
other hand, government action that leaves the individual free to make
choices (while also bearing the consequences) or that refrains from
lifting from the individual the consequences of those choices, is generally acceptable, at least in the face of liberty interests.
In the following pages I will illustrate these strands of "self-reliance" as they are manifested in a selected group of opinions authored
by Justice Blackmun. For each "strand" I draw primarily on opinions
written by Justice Blackmun during the 1972 Term or the Terms closely
surrounding it, turning thereafter to one or more illustrative decisions at
a later point in his tenure. For example, in addressing Justice
Blackmun's antipathy toward governmental impediments to the individual's liberty I point to Roe v. Wade, 8 Sugarman v. Dougall,9 and
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.lO His later opinions disfavoring governmental efforts to supplant
liberty or responsibility or to substitute government preferences for the
individual's own include Planned Parenthood v. Casey,"l Bowers v.
Hardwick,12 and Rust v. Sullivan.13 Justice Blackmun's more accommodating attitude toward government action that is neutral with respect
to liberty and responsibility (though it falls unevenly) is illustrated in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez14 and Nordlinger
v. Hahn.15 Finally, Justice Blackmun's receptive attitude toward government action that encourages liberty or reinforces the individual's
7. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), Randall P. Bezanson, Emancipation
as Freedom in Roe v. Wade, 97 DICK. L. REv. 485 (1993).
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
10. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
11. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
12. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
13. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
14. 411 U.S. 1(1973).
15. 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992).
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responsibility for the consequences of its exercise is manifested in NLRB
v. Granite State Joint Board,1 6 United States v. Kras.7 and in his brief
but revealing dissent in Cohen v. California.I8
My discussion of these cases will, by necessity, be brief; I will paint
with a broad (perhaps too broad) brush. But I have no doubt that more
than compassion, more than sympathy, more than liberalism, is involved
in Justice Blackmun's work. To conclude otherwise would be, in my
judgment, to give him far too little recognition as a jurist of intellectual
substance and complexity-a man who believes strongly in our common
humanity and our individual freedom, but who understands as well that,
as Isaiah Berlin put it, people who are free are also "doomed to
choose." 19

It takes little effort, of course, to discover Justice Blackmun's
unequivocal commitment to individual liberty . . . to the necessary
freedom the individual must have to make choices about beliefs, values,
and identity without significant interference from government. Roe v.
Wade,20 authored by Justice Blackmun and handed down in early 1973,
is surely his most famous and complete articulation of the individual's
freedom to make and act upon life-defining choices, a freedom he has
described metaphorically as "emancipation." 2 1 The freedom is one of
power to make choices, as well as responsibility for their consequences; it
is a product not of equality but of liberty; not of gender but of what it
means to be a whole person. The generalizable and fundamental nature
of the liberty affirmed in Roe was clear in Justice Blackmun's opinion,
but any doubt about its nature was dispelled in his later opinions-both
dissents-in Bowers v. Hardwick22 and Rust v. Sullivan.2 3 There he
could say, in the freer medium of a dissenting opinion, that Bowers was
no more about 'a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy,' as the Court purports to declare, than Stanley v.
Georgia was about a fundamental right to watch obscene
movies, or Katz v. United States was about a fundamental right
to place interstate bets from a telephone booth. Rather, this
case is about 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

409 U.S. 213 (1972) (Blackmun, J, dissenting).
409 U.S. 434 (1973).
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Is im BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HutFrYr
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Bezanson, supra note 7.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
500 U.S. 173 (1991).

13 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991).
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most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let
alone .,24

And he could say in Rust that "Roe v. Wade and its progeny are
not so much about a medical procedure as they are about a woman's
fundamental right to self-determination. .

.

. the idea that 'liberty,' if it

means anything, must entail freedom from governmental domination in
making the most intimate and personal of decisions."25
Justice Blackmun's commitment to individual freedom was also
reflected in two other decisions, one from the 1973 Term and one from
1974, though they are not generally seen in this light. The first is
Sugarman v. Dougall,26 where the Court in an opinion by Justice
Blackmun extended the equal protection guarantee to prohibit discrimination against legal aliens in most government employment. 2 7 The
restriction stricken by the Court was offensive not only to equal protection principles, but more fundamentally to an individual's ability to
exercise control over his or her own destiny free from obstacles resting
on "irrational parochialism and prejudice," 28 and thus bearing no
relationship to the individual's ability.
Justice Blackmun's equal protection opinions reflect a larger
concern than inequality. They reflect instead a concern with paternalism
borne of stereotype-a moral arrogance that those who are different
cannot be trusted with their own liberty and therefore can be forced, as
Justice Blackmun put it, to abide by the majority's "concepts of the
socially desirable, the publicly acceptable, and the morally sound, with a
29
touch of the devil-take-the-hindmost."
The connection to freedom from artificial government restraints on
the "market" of individual choice and accomplishment is perhaps more
explicit in the decisions, just a few years later, in Bigelow v. Virginia30
and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
24. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (citations omitted) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,216 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
26. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
27. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971) (extending equal protection guarantee to prohibit discrimination against legal aliens in welfare
assistance programs).
28. Karlan, supra note 3, at 533.
29. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438,462-63 (1977). As Pamela Karlan so nicely put it:
The Justice has identified the flaw in our constitutional reasoning as lying "in the way we
treat those who are not exactly like us, in the way we treat those who do not behave as
we do, in the way we treat each other." Indeed, the Justice's language, far from
distinguishing "us" from "them", teaches us that when "we" mistreat "one another" we
are in fact mistreating ourselves.
Karlan, supra note 3, at 538 (quoting Harry A. Blackmun, John Jay and the FederalistPapers, 8 PACE
L. REV. 237, 247 (1988)).
30. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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Council, Inc..31 These decisions, both written by Justice Blackmun, first
announced significant constitutional protection for commercial speech.32
While they are important First Amendment decisions, I think it would be
a mistake to understand them Only in those terms. Instead, they are part
of a larger mosaic of jurisprudence that reflects individual liberty of
choice-in this case choice of information-and significantly restricts
government's authority to substitute its own vision of the "good" or
"right" for the individual's freedom-and responsibility-to decide.
The commercial speech cases are thus more closely related than most
would imagine to Justice Blackmun's opinion in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,33 where he expressed concern about government paternalism that
takes the form of shaping the information upon which individuals make
personal and moral choices, thereby intruding government's moral
preferences on the otherwise "free" choices of individuals. 34 Whether
government shapes information by direct restriction, as in commercial
speech cases, or by mandatory counseling and one-sided moral suasion,
as in Casey and Rust v. Sullivan, such actions undermine the very
freedom of individual choice that they often declare but, in fact, only
nominally preserve.
The idea of freedom expressed in Roe v. Wade is but part of a
larger idea of liberty underlying Justice Blackmun's work. To view his
other opinions as existing only in separate and tidy doctrinal
boxes-commercial speech; equality-is to miss the larger theme. The
commercial speech cases are, to be sure, speech cases involving the First
Amendment, but they are also parts of a larger and coherent idea of
liberty; the same is true of equal protection cases such as Sugarman. To
borrow from Justice Blackmun's turn of phrase in Bowers v. Hardwick,
they are no more only about speech or equality "than Stanley v.
Georgia was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies" or
Bowers was about a right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 35
I began this essay, however, with the theme "self-reliance," and I
need to explain how this discussion of liberty relates to the idea of selfreliance. To do so I will touch briefly upon a number of cases that, at
first glance, seem problematic and perhaps inconsistent with the cases
discussed above, but on reflection are not only consistent, but can best be
31.
32.
Virginia
33.
34.
35.

425 U.S. 748 (1976).
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 (1975); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,770 (1976).
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
See id. at 2807, 2818; Bezanson, supra note 7, at 488-89.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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35

explained by the idea that freedom carries with it responsibility for the
results of its exercise, and that the exercise of freedom is something that
is earned, not simply conferred. It is in these senses that the
complementary ideas of individual freedom and individual responsibility
for its exercise are combined in my use of the Midwestern idea of "selfreliance."
Two opinions written early in Justice Blackmun's service on the
Court are often viewed as discordant with his otherwise expansive view of
liberty, and therefore as requiring either explanation or, simply,
forgiveness. These are Justice Blackmun's dissent in Cohen v.
California,36 where he pithily described Cohen's attempt at expression as
an "absurd and immature antic . . . mainly conduct and little speech," 37
and his opinion for the Court in United States v. Kras,3 8 where he
refused to invalidate the $50.00 filing fee for a personal bankruptcy
petition, when applied to an unemployed indigent with five dependents,
observing that the $1.28/week payment schedule for the fee was "a sum
less than the payments Kras makes on his couch of negligible value in
storage, and less than the price of a movie and little more than the cost of
a pack or two of cigarettes." 39
The Cohen case presented a claim, in Justice Blackmun's view, that
demeaned the First Amendment guarantee, that reduced its importance
by pressing it into service in defense of conduct that not only
seemed-but was-immature, insensitive, capricious, and hardly
commensurate with the serious purposes of freedom of speech. For
Justice Blackmun the important issue in the Cohen case was whether
Cohen's actions amounted to speech-a term whose meaning derives not
from the dictionary, but from the important purposes served by the word
in the Constitution. For him, the act of indiscriminate-almost
aimless-circulation of words that possessed no unambiguous meaning,
much less intent to communicate that meaning to others for a purpose,
was not speech. Speaking is an intentional and purposeful act that
presupposes a minimal level of maturity; undertaken, in other words,
with at least some sense of the importance of liberty itself and the
purposes to which it is devoted. Cohen's "absurd and immature antic"
was child's play ... the speech equivalent of a temper tantrum, "mainly
conduct and little speech."40 To spend the First Amendment liberty on

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
409 U.S. 434 (1973).
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,449 (1973).
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the defense of frivolousness was, for Justice Blackmun, to waste it and to
cheapen it in the process.
Similar sentiments, I suspect, can be attributed to the Kras case, an
unfortunately-named, carefully planned part of a litigation strategy that
forced 4 ' the Court to define the meaning of the grand constitutional
concepts of due process and equality in the context of a person's refusal
to pay $1.28 per week until $50.00 had been paid. One could easily be
impatient with the bureaucrat who, faced with a request for waiver and
the possibility of litigation, was unimaginative or mean-spirited enough
to dig in his or her heels. But for Justice Blackmun, who was charged
with the duty to decide, like it or not, it seemed doubtful that a person
seriously intent on straightening matters out in bankruptcy, who received
with his dependents over $400.00 in monthly public assistance, could not
find $5.00 each month to "pay the price" for his right to petition.
Liberty must not only be taken seriously, its exercise must be
earned-paid for, at least, in the coin of earnestness and good faith.
Justice Blackmun's skepticism about claims that he saw as contrived
or insufficiently serious, and thus insulting to those who might genuinely
suffer disability at the hands of government, was often manifested in the
form of explicit expressions of impatience-with the litigants and with
the risks their claims posed for the frequently important substantive
claim. The Cohen and Kras cases were not the only examples; nor was
the impatience always-or even usually-directed toward the private
litigants. Indeed, Justice Blackmun reserved some of his strongest
language for government. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.42 he
responded to the State's rationale for denying an employment
discrimination hearing on grounds of lateness (caused by the State's
scheduling mistake) by demanding that the State's justification "must be
something more than the exercise of a strained imagination." 4 3 Like
Cohen's and Kras's, the State's conduct too was held by Justice Blackmun
to a standard of good faith and seriousness, for the Court's duty, as he
said in Bakke, was "expounding a Constitution."44
A related idea of responsibility for the exercise of one's liberty or
freedom, in the sense of paying the price of its consequences, is
manifested in a little-known lone dissent during the 1972 Term in NLRB
v. Granite State Joint Board.45 The case involved a union's imposition

41. The case came to the Court on appeal, not on certiorari.
42. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
43. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,442 (1982) (Blackmun, J., separate opinion).
44. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265. 408 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
separate opinion).
45. 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
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of a fine on strike-breaking workers who voted in favor of the strike and
of the union's authority to levy fines on those members who did not
stand firm. 46 The Court (all of the Justices except Justice Blackmun)
concluded that the strike-breaking fine could not be enforced because
the workers had resigned from the union before the fine was levied (but
not until after the strike was underway), and had not been specifically
notified in the union contract that a post-resignation fine could be
levied. In lone dissent Justice Blackmun strongly disagreed, stating that
"the three factors of a member's strike vote, his ratification of strikebreaking penalties, and his actual participation in the strike, [are] far
more reliable indicia of his obligation to the union and its members
than" the absence of specific (and "boilerplate") notice in the union
contract. "Union activity," he continued, "by its very nature, is group
activity, and is grounded on the notion that strength can be garnered
from unity, solidarity, and mutual commitment." 4 7 The members had
freely exercised their rights to band together with others, and in doing so
had assumed personal responsibility for the consequences of their own
choices. Neither rights nor responsibilities, in short, were to be taken
lightly, and the enjoyment of those rights should be earned-at least
deserved.
Finally, at least brief mention should be made of Justice Blackmun's
generally 48 deferential attitude to government actions that fall unevenly
on grounds of wealth. Without pretense of exhaustiveness, his votes in
three cases serve to manifest Justice Blackmun's relatively complex view
and to relate it to what has already been said about liberty and
responsibility. The first case is San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, 49 an opinion Justice Blackmun joined but did not write,
which upheld against constitutional attack a property tax school funding
system that yielded large and seemingly idiosyncratic variations in
50
funding based, in significant (though not exclusive) part, on wealth.
5
1
The second and more recent opinion is Nordlinger v. Hahn, written by
Justice Blackmun, which sustained the property tax valuation system
46. NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
47. Id. at 221.
48. As with much of Justice Blackmun's judicial work, the answer is more complex than even the
word "generally" would imply. He has joined the view that classifications that discriminate explicitly
and purposefully against the poor are suspect, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971) (dissenting
opinion joined by Blackmun, J.), but that classifications based on or falling along wealth lines, in the
absence of invidious purpose or the attendant denial of a substantive constitutional interest (such as
speech, liberty, etc.), should be judged by relatively forgiving standards of review. See, e.g.,
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 231 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
49. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
50. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
51. 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992).
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created by Proposition 13 in California-a system that has produced
wild variations in taxable value that bear no relation to current market
value .52

In both cases the challenged statutes visited significant burdens on
those who were poor, or rested on criteria whose principal consequence
in practice was wealth-based discrimination. For Justice Blackmun,
however, the wealth-based disparities bore no necessary and systematic
relation to liberty in either case. A general rule of deference to wealthbased legislative classifications was warranted, in Justice Blackmun's view,
because he did not see wealth as a prerequisite to liberty, nor did he view
its absence an obstacle to liberty's exercise. Only when wealth is
employed as a surrogate for direct denial of an exercise of liberty, as
with the denial of public funding for the exercise of the woman's right to
consider and have an abortion,5 3 is liberty, as Justice Blackmun uses the
term, truly at stake.
This more elaborated view of the relationship between wealth-based
distinctions in particular, and legislative classifications in general, on the
one hand, and liberty interests, on the other, is made explicit in his
concurring opinion in Plyler v. Doe,54 where he concluded that a Texas
statute denying free public education to illegal alien children violated the
Constitution. 55 His opinion is worth quoting at some length.
I joined [the opinion of] the Court in Rodriguez, and I
continue to believe that it provides the appropriate model for
resolving most equal protection disputes.

.

.

.

[But that]

formulation does not settle every issue of "fundamental
rights" arising under the Equal Protection Clause.
. . . Children denied an education are placed at a permanent
and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, .

.

.

Other

benefits provided by the State, such as housing and public
assistance, are of course important; to an individual in
immediate need, they may be more desirable than the right to
be educated. But classifications involving the complete denial
of education are in a sense unique, for they . . . involv[e] the
State in the creation of permanent class distinctions ....
This

conclusion is fully consistent with Rodriguez. The Court there
reserved judgment on the constitutionality of a state system that
52. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992).
53. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 462 (1977)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
54. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
55. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,231 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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"occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to
any of its children," noting that "no charge fairly could be
made that the system [in Rodriguez] fail[ed] to provide each
child with an opportunity to acquire . . . basic minimal
skills ."56

Justice Blackmun denied, both as a constitutional matter and as a reality
of life's experience, that relative wealth or class had much to do with
one's ability to enjoy liberty or experience its fruits; indeed, to reason in
the opposite (that relative poverty represented a denial of liberty) was to
excuse peoples' indifference to liberty or responsibility for its exercise. 5 7
What was important to Justice Blackmun, therefore, was not inequality
itself, but its consequences and its real relationship to the individual's
opportunity to exercise freedom mindful also of his or her responsibility
for the choices so made.
Perhaps I have erred in trying to draw together a disparate and
potentially idiosyncratic set of Justice Blackmun's decisions in order to
identify the connecting fibre of "liberty" in Justice Blackmun's privacy,
equal protection, speech, due process, and even labor opinions. Some
may prefer to see them as distinct and occasionally discordant notes in
an otherwise substantial record of compassion, sympathy for those less
able to help themselves, and skepticism about government interference
with essentially personal matters. What I am suggesting, however, is that
they need not be seen as discordant; and if they are consistent they need
not be seen as inconsistent with compassion, sympathy, and skepticism
about intrusive government.
For Justice Blackmun what was most important was the individual's
liberty in our constitutional scheme-the liberty to act, to choose, to
believe, to express, to work. Equality was important, for example, but it
was most important in relation to the exercise of liberty and not as a
means of shielding the individual from its consequences. Speech was
important, but its central value was one of individual liberty-of the
speaker or, in the commercial speech cases, of those whose liberty to
make their own decisions was made more complete by it. The
individual's freedom to organize and collectively bargain was an
important legislative right, but for the individual who chose to do so the
liberty was purchased with responsibilities, too.
Liberty to speak no more meant a right to indeterminate babble
than freedom to work meant a guaranteed job. When government
56. Id. at 232-35 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
57. Cf. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464,481 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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regulation made the going more difficult for some, but did not prevent
their succeeding, or did not change the standard of success or failure
from one that everyone, with effort, could strive for, Justice Blackmun
had a relatively expansive view of government power.5 8 There are
perhaps no better illustrations of this than his concurrence in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke,59 where he urged deference to
educational judgment with the words "[in order to get beyond racism,
we must first take account of race;" 60 or his dissenting opinion in City of
Richmond v. Croson,6 1 where he would have upheld a race-conscious
municipal contracting set-aside, especially when enacted "on its own ...
[by] the City of Richmond, Virginia, the cradle of the Old
Confederacy ."62
For Justice Blackmun it was the individual's capacity to exercise
liberty, not the relative ease with which it could be exercised, that was
constitutionally crucial. Government efforts to prevent its exercise or to
exercise it for the individual were serious threats to freedom. But with
liberty came the expectation of seriousness of purpose and responsibility
for its exercise. When the individual's action deprecated the liberty
being claimed, failed to respect its importance, or reflected indifference
to the responsibilities that exercising freedom implies, Justice Blackmun
would view the individual's claim with skepticism and impatience. With
liberty came the expectation, in other words, that the individual claiming
a right to liberty would, to the extent possible, be self-reliant in its
exercise . . . independent of rather than dependent on government;
possessed of true moral agency.
This, of course, was the essence of Roe v. Wade. Without freedom
and responsibility for the most personal and difficult of life's choices, a
woman could not be a whole person, a person possessed of independent
free will and the responsibility for its exercise. But Roe v. Wade was not
just about women, it was about persons; it was not just about abortion, it
was about liberty; it was not just about freedom, it was about
responsibility. For Justice Blackmun, constitutional law was serious
business. It still is. And it also remains true that without responsibility
freedom cannot exist ... that if we are genuinely free to choose we are,
by necessity, also "doomed to choose."

58. Eg., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
59. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
60. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 406 (1978) (Blackmun, J., separate opinion).
61. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
62. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 561 (1989) (Blackmun. J.,
dissenting)
(emphasis added).

